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Abstract 
[Excerpt] Although it has taken almost a decade to gain formal recognition, it has finally happened. In 
February, 1985 the AFL-CIO announced its endorsement of corporate campaigns, and encouraged 
affiliates to consider their use more aggressively and more often. The endorsement appeared in The 
Changing Situation of Workers and Their Unions, a report prepared by AFL-CIO Committee on the 
Evolution of Work. 
While it is encouraging that the AFL-CIO has endorsed the concept, it also sends off alarms for those who 
have been involved in campaigns. The alarm sounds for the issue of "timeliness" in initiating corporate 
campaigns, and for the understanding of the time, commitment and resources necessary to assess, 
develop and implement them. 
Most campaigns have been initiated as a form of strike assistance or in response to a crisis, such as 
plant closures, runaway shops or union-busting. While corporate campaigns can be useful in these 
situations, their potential is maximized when used to bolster organizing drives or the collective bargaining 
process. 
The arguments for initiating a campaign prior to a strike or crisis are logical. A corporate campaign gives 
unions the power to put a company on the defensive by isolating it from the rest of its business, political 
and social communities. The sooner this process is set in motion, the greater the potential for averting 
the crisis or minimizing the damage. Early intervention of a campaign also provides a greater opportunity 
to build a firm foundation for the union's future. 
Timing the initiation of a campaign involves more than assessing the potential for a crisis. It also requires 
an understanding of the time unions need to prepare a campaign that can place the union on the 
offensive. It takes time to identify the targets and tactics that can accomplish this goal. Thousands of 
pages of company and government records must be analyzed. The company's community image must be 
assessed. The local media's treatment of the union and company must be evaluated. The potential for 
coalition-building must be determined. And hours upon hours of discussion must take place with workers 
who know best the working conditions, attitudes and practices of the company. It is extremely difficult to 
accomplish these tasks while responding to the immediate needs of a strike, an impasse in negotiations 
or a plant closure. 
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Although it has taken almost a decade to gain formal recognition, 
it has finally happened. In February, 1985 the AFL-CIO announced 
its endorsement of corporate campaigns, and encouraged affiliates 
to consider their use more aggressively and more often. The 
endorsement appeared in The Changing Situation of Workers and 
Their Unions, a report prepared by AFL-CIO Committee on the 
Evolution of Work. 
While it is encouraging that the AFL-CIO has endorsed the 
concept, it also sends off alarms for those who have been involved 
in campaigns. The alarm sounds for the issue of "timeliness" in 
initiating corporate campaigns, and for the understanding of the 
time, commitment and resources necessary to assess, develop and 
implement them. 
Most campaigns have been initiated as a form of strike assistance 
or in response to a crisis, such as plant closures, runaway shops 
or union-busting. While corporate campaigns can be useful in 
these situations, their potential is maximized when used to bolster 
organizing drives or the collective bargaining process. 
The arguments for initiating a campaign prior to a strike or crisis 
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are logical. A corporate campaign gives unions the power to put 
a company on the defensive by isolating it from the rest of its 
business, political and social communities. The sooner this process 
is set in motion, the greater the potential for averting the crisis 
or minimizing the damage. Early intervention of a campaign also 
provides a greater opportunity to build a firm foundation for the 
union's future. 
Timing the initiation of a campaign involves more than assessing 
the potential for a crisis. It also requires an understanding of the 
time unions need to prepare a campaign that can place the union 
on the offensive. It takes time to identify the targets and tactics 
that can accomplish this goal. Thousands of pages of company 
and government records must be analyzed. The company's 
community image must be assessed. The local media's treatment 
of the union and company must be evaluated. The potential for 
coalition-building must be determined. And hours upon hours of 
discussion must take place with workers who know best the 
working conditions, attitudes and practices of the company. It is 
extremely difficult to accomplish these tasks while responding to 
the immediate needs of a strike, an impasse in negotiations or a 
plant closure. 
Campaign Components 
Most corporate campaigns have three components: research and 
analysis, campaign design, and campaign implementation. 
Although the first component is continuous, the best campaign 
allows sufficient time for the bulk of the research to be completed 
prior to its formal initiation. The amount of time needed depends 
upon the complexity of the targeted company, the 
labor-management relationship, and the strengths and weaknesses 
of the union. In most situations a minimum of three months is 
necessary to conduct the basic research and to begin to flush out 
a possible campaign strategy. 
The research component is designed to identify the company's 
pressure points and determine what vehicles will help the union 
take advantage of these potential weaknesses. In addition to 
analysing corporate and government documents, media files, and 
other resource materials, research also includes an examination 
of the community where workers live and an assessment of the 
media potential, both locally and nationally. 
Since most campaigns require participation of the community, 
it is necessary to assess the potential for community support and 
involvement. Workers are a critical source of information. The 
research must examine existing community organizations, church 
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Campaigns depend a great deal on media coverage. Prior to in-
itiating a campaign, the researchers must examine the media 
response to the company and to labor. The examination can 
identify reporters likely to cover campaign events and suggest 
areas which warrant media preparation, such as meetings with 
assignment editors to inform them of the purpose and significance 
of corporate campaigns. Researching the media also gives a union 
a sense of the company's image and power in the community. It 
can identify pressure points, such as contracting work outside the 
state or a history of local tax favoritism. 
The research stage also requires an assessment of the strengths 
and weaknesses of the union. If the union leadership is 
inexperienced in dealing with the media or consistently responds 
defensively to reporters, it may be necessary to plan media training 
sessions with union spokespersons. An evaluation of the union's 
communications with members should be conducted. If it is 
sporadic, it may be necessary to institute and formalize regular 
mailings, handouts or postings. 
Although this is only a thumbnail sketch of the work involved 
in the research and analysis stage, it highlights the preparation 
needed to develop a consistent long-term strategy in which each 
action is designed to intensify the pressure. In some situations, 
timely initiation of a campaign may avert the impending crisis. 
At the least, it will position the union to put management on the 
defensive from the outset. 
IBEW 1466 IN OHIO 
The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) 
Local 1466 recognized the importance of timeliness and initiated 
the research component of its corporate campaign against 
Columbus & Southern Ohio Electric Company/American Electric 
Power (C & SOE/AEP) approximately 10 weeks prior to the 
opening of contract negotiations. 
The local, representing 1,400 workers at C & SOE in 
Southeastern Ohio, anticipated the worst. The company had slickly 
promoted the "belt-tightening" theme among the workers for 
several months, preaching that profits were down, and, therefore, 
that it must turn to the workers for savings. C & SOE wanted 
cutbacks in safety and training programs, elimination of seniority 
provisions, company control over work rules, and elimination of 
the union shop. C & SOE did not claim that an open shop would 
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be cost-effective. Rather, the company stated that it wanted to give 
the workers freedom of choice whether or not to belong to the 
union. 
Research revealed that labor costs had gone down in the last 
five years. In addition, the workforce had declined and 
productivity was up. Labor had done its job. 
On the other hand, the union discovered that costs due to 
management decisions had increased dramatically. For example, 
due to serious design and safety problems, the federal government 
ordered the shutdown of a nuclear power plant the company was 
building with two other utilities. The company stands to lose over 
$500 million, and the resulting uncertainty sent the company's 
interest payments on long-term debt skyrocketing. 
The company's poor-mouthing about the decline in profits 
proved to be misleading. The union's research revealed that the 
workers had turned a healthy profit for the company the year 
before — approximately $73 million. A close examination of how 
the company used these profits showed that all proceeds were paid 
out in dividends: $21 million to preferred stockholders and $66 
million to common stockholders. 
If you are quick with your math, you have already realized that 
the total dividend payments equal $87 million, or $14 million more 
than the company's total reported profit! The extra $14 million 
had been lifted by the company from its previous earnings. The 
union rightfully concluded that more than simply failing to 
reinvest any of the profits, management had actually been actively 
disinvesting in the company. 
Such shenanigans made sense after the union examined 
American Electric's control of C&SOE. The union, through its 
interlock research, discovered that American Electric owned 100% 
of C&SOE's common stock. And, eight of the ten C&SOE board 
members (who are charged with the responsibility of deciding 
what to do with the profits) were on American Electric's payroll. 
In short, research revealed a consistent pattern: labor costs were 
down, management costs were up, and the company, contrary to 
its propaganda, was healthy. 
Armed with these facts, the union began to prepare its strategy 
for putting C&SOE/AEP on the defensive. It determined that the 
company's vulnerabilities could best be exposed in several ways: 
1) Activating the public to protest management's poor 
decisions which reduced quality service and caused higher utility 
bills. 
2) Organizing workers to protest costly mistakes made by 
management. 
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Steelworkers President Lynn Williams addresses rally of Phelps Dodge 
copper strikers in 1984. The USWA initiated a corporate campaign against 
Phelps after the strike was nearly lost, with the idea of punishing the 
company as an object lesson to other companies who might be 
contemplating the use of Phelps' ruthless strike-breaking tactics. 
3) Educating the media about the company's financial 
mismanagement and its insistence that workers pay the cost. 
4) Developing a negotiations strategy that incorporated the 
research and included a cost-cutting proposal directed at 
management. 
To test the waters, the union developed a newsletter and flyer 
that were distributed by shop stewards to every worker three days 
before negotiations began. The materials presented the theme of 
the campaign: Labor costs are down, management's costs are up, 
the company is healthy — now it's managements turn to tighten 
its belt. The materials talked specifically about labor costs, but 
did not reveal the specific costly management decisions uncovered 
in the research. 
The union's strategy called for creating a sense of power among 
the workers who, for the last three months, had been led to believe 
that they were responsible for a downturn in profits and, 
consequently, would have to bear the burden in the next contract. 
The materials also carried an "800" number that workers could 
call for daily updates on the campaign and negotiations. 
The response was perfect. Workers began to feel more positive 
about their union, and management was anxiously trying to find 
out which of its mistakes the union had uncovered. 
To provoke further response and broaden the base of support, 
96 CORPORATE CAMPAIGNS 
the union distributed 2,000 buttons that stated "Workers and 
Customers Won't Pay for Management Mistakes." After workers 
flooded the workplace with buttons pinned to their garb, 
management opened the negotiating session by announcing that 
any worker who failed to remove the button would face 
disciplinary action. Following the announcement, management 
moved for adjournment. The union spokesperson responded 
swiftly and offensively, accusing the company of refusing to go 
forward with the collective bargaining process due to a harmless 
button. 
Management had overreacted. The union had the company right 
where it wanted it—in a defensive posture. The workers sensed 
victory, the union negotiating team felt confident, and the media 
and the community were growing more and more curious. 
After a week of negotiations, the union announced its plan to 
hold a press conference to officially launch its corporate campaign. 
With all local media notified by the union, the company over-
reacted again. Selected management called the major print media 
the day before the press conference to say the company was ready 
to respond. The media's response was "respond to what?" since 
the union had no intention of revealing its specific charges of com-
pany mismanagement until the hour of the press conference. 
Having been caught off-guard, the company was not able to 
prepare an adequate response to the union's charges. The company 
refused to comment on the union's data that wages were down 
and management costs up. It called the union's moves "public 
relations pranks" while, in the same breath, agreeing with the 
union's charge that the company was healthy. Within two hours 
of the press conference, the company's written response was 
delivered to the media. It was typed on plain white paper and full 
of typographical errors. As one reporter commented to me, "I have 
never seen this company, the world's largest utility, respond like 
this. I'd say you have them on the run." 
As for collective bargaining, the union began to incorporate its 
research into its negotiations strategy. The plan included 
questioning management continuously about its previous mistakes 
and how it intended to make up the cost. When the company tried 
to put the union on the defensive by attacking the union shop, 
the union was prepared to put the heat back on the company by 
raising other issues such as safety and reduced maintenance 
expenses. 
IBEW Local 1466 had the advantage of time. Although an 
additional month would have been helpful, the union managed 
to accomplish the basic tasks for preparation of a corporate 
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campaign. Having time on its side, the union was able to identify 
and correct some of its weaknesses, such as an unreliable 
membership communications system and weak relations with the 
media, and to develop a strategy which put the union on the 
offensive prior to negotiations. More and more today, it is at the 
negotiating table where the real power plays occur, which is where 
corporate campaigns can demonstrate their most promising use. 
Conclusion 
The most effective and resourceful campaigns leave in place 
critical mechanisms which further strengthen the union's structure 
and cohesiveness. For example, an effective campaign will 
convince the leadership of the importance of consistent 
communications with members and regular contact with the 
media. It will teach the members that regular monitoring of the 
company, financially and otherwise, is imperative. There is no time 
like the present to begin to build the case for the next round of 
negotiations. A quality campaign will enable the union to see 
issues in a broader context, instill confidence to go public with 
its information and concerns, and convince the members of the 
importance of solidarity beyond the walls of the union hall. Again, 
the more time a union allows for campaign preparation the more 
likely a firm foundation will be built. 
Obviously I have skimmed over the nuts and bolts of developing 
and implementing a corporate campaign. My purpose is to sound 
the alarm on the AFL-CIO's endorsement of corporate campaigns 
by emphasizing the time and resources that an effective campaign 
demands and the importance of timeliness to maximize a 
campaign's potential. 
It took years to build the institutions that today house labor. It 
involved continual struggle to implement often complicated 
strategies that arose from an understanding of power and a 
determination to obtain it. Corporate America has also worked 
diligently over time. It has taken advantage of labor's weaknesses, 
strategically undercut its strengths, and cunningly maneuvered 
itself into a powerful position of control over the workplace and 
the public at large. 
If the labor movement is committed to maximizing the potential 
good that corporate campaigns can achieve, then it will have to 
accept the fact that they take time. And herein lies the rub. Too 
often, unions have considered these campaigns as "quick fixes." 
Yet our own history tells us there is no such thing. 
